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Criminal Law.  State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288 (R.I. 2019). 
Stephen Mattatall (Mattatall) sought a motion to correct an 
allegedly illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode Island 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.1  In denying the 
motion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Mattatall was 
not entitled to relief under Rule 35 because the trial justice did not 
impose an illegal sentence.2  Recognizing that Mattatall’s parole 
eligibility was improperly calculated, however, the Court exercised 
supervisory jurisdiction in order to allow Mattatall to seek relief 
from the trial justice.3 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 24, 1982, John Scanlon was found dead in 
Stephen Mattatall’s home.4  Mattatall was indicted for Scanlon’s 
murder on January 7, 1983, and held without bail for both the 
murder and weapons charges.5  After what would be the first of 
three trials, Mattatall was found guilty of second-degree murder 
and was sentenced to forty years of imprisonment, with thirty years 
to serve and ten years suspended with probation.6  Because 
Mattatall was deemed a “habitual criminal offender,” the trial 
justice also imposed an additional ten years to serve.7 
Mattatall appealed his conviction to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court), arguing in part that the admission of statements 
made to an individual named John Carney, which were overheard 
by police officers present in Carney’s home at the time, violated his 
1. State v. Mattatall, 219 A.3d 1288, 1289 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 1293–94.
3. Id. at 1294.
4. Id. at 1289–90.
5. Id. at 1290.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel.8  The Court agreed, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that 
the police had violated Mattatall’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by eavesdropping on statements he made about pending 
charges against him to John Carney, even though the police were 
at Carney’s home to investigate an unrelated crime.9  The State 
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.10  The Supreme Court directed the Court to reconsider 
its decision in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson.11  After reconsidering its decision, the Court reaffirmed its 
initial holding, re-vacating the conviction and remanding the case 
for a new trial.12 
During Mattatall’s second trial in September of 1987, Mattatall 
was held in contempt of court twice for persistent courtroom 
misconduct.13  Consequently, a mistrial was declared.14  After 
Mattatall’s third trial in 1988, he was found guilty of second-degree 
murder and “sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment, with fifty 
years to serve and ten years suspended, with probation.”15  
Mattatall was again deemed a habitual offender and as a result 
8. Id.; State v. Mattatall, 510 A.2d 947, 952 (R.I. 1986).  Mattatall also
argued that incriminating statements he made to police were inadmissible 
because the police had illegally detained him prior to questioning him.  See 
Mattatall, 510 A.2d at 950. 
9. Mattatall, 510 A.2d at 953.
10. Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1290.
11. Id.  In Kuhlmann, the United States Supreme Court stated that “the
Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever—by luck or happenstance—the 
State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to 
counsel has attached.”  Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (quoting 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Instead, the defendant must prove that the police and an informant 
“took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to 
elicit incriminating remarks.”  Id.  Prior to the Kuhlmann decision, prosecutors 
could not admit incriminating statements by defendants when those 
statements were made directly to police or jailhouse informants after the 
accused had retained an attorney.  See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 180 (holding 
that respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated 
by admission at trial of self-incriminating statements made after indictment 
to codefendant, an undercover informant). 





2020] SURVEY SECTION 617 
received an additional sentence of twenty years to be served 
consecutively to the sentence for his second-degree murder 
conviction.16  Mattatall would not be eligible for parole for the first 
eighteen years of the twenty-year habitual offender sentence.17  
The Court affirmed Mattatall’s conviction in 1992.18  
Mattatall served the next twenty-three years in prison.19  All 
the while, Mattatall continued to challenge his conviction and 
sentences.20  While in prison, Mattatall also appeared before the 
parole board in 2002, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2015.21  Parole 
was always denied for reasons including the serious nature of 
Mattatall’s crime, his past criminal history, and the length of his 
sentence.22  Mattatall was finally granted parole on July 13, 2015, 
at which point he had been incarcerated for more than thirty-two 
years.23   
Mattatall’s most recent challenge came in 2016, when he filed 
a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode 
Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.24  In addition 
to this motion, Mattatall filed an application for postconviction 
relief.25  The Superior Court heard both matters on July 25, 2018.26  
In Superior Court, Mattatall conceded that the sentence imposed 
was not an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a).27  He argued, instead, 
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1119 (R.I. 1992)).
19. See id. at 1291.
20. Id. at 1290–91.






27. Id.  Rule 35(a) states:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.  The court may 
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and it may reduce any 
sentence when a motion is filed within one hundred and twenty (120) 
days after the sentence is imposed, or within one hundred and twenty 
(120) days after receipt by the court of a mandate of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island issued upon affirmance of the judgment or
dismissal of the appeal, or within one hundred and twenty (120) days
after receipt by the court of a mandate or order of the Supreme Court
of the United States issued upon affirmance of the judgment,
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that the error was in the way the habitual offender sentence was 
ordered to be executed—consecutive to his second-degree murder 
conviction rather than concurrently.28  Mattatall argued that while 
the sentence was not illegal under Rule 35, “its execution was illegal 
and constituted a violation of his due-process rights because it 
deprived him of his right to appear before the parole board for 
eighteen years, which was eight years longer than [section] 13-8-13 
provided.”29 
The State, however, disagreed.30  The State argued that this 
error did not render Mattatall’s sentence illegal under Rule 35.31  
The State also asserted that Mattatall was not prejudiced by 
serving eight additional years before seeing the parole board 
because the board’s rationales for denying parole were not related 
to Mattatall’s conduct while imprisoned.32 
The Superior Court justice ultimately agreed with the State, 
holding that Mattatall’s twenty-year habitual offender sentence 
could not be altered because, as Mattatall conceded, the sentence 
was not an illegal sentence under Rule 35.33  Accordingly, the 
Superior Court justice denied Mattatall’s motion to correct an 
illegal sentence.34  Mattatall subsequently appealed the decision to 
the Court.35  
dismissal of the appeal, or denial of a writ of certiorari.  The court 
shall act on the motion within a reasonable time, provided that any 
delay by the court in ruling on the motion shall not prejudice the 
movant.  The court may reduce a sentence, the execution of which has 
been suspended, upon revocation of probation. 
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
28. Mattatall, 219 A.3d at 1291.
29. Id. at 1292.  Rhode Island General Laws section 13-8-13(a) states that
“[i]n the case of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life, a parole permit 
may be issued at any time after the prisoner has served not less than ten (10) 
years imprisonment.”  13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13(a). 






2020] SURVEY SECTION 619 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the trial justice’s decision, the Court adhered to a 
“strong policy against interfering with a trial justice’s discretion in 
sentencing matters.”36  Accordingly, the Court stated that its 
review of the trial justice’s decision would be “extremely limited.”37  
The Court, however, applied a de novo standard of review, as is 
customary when reviewing a trial justice’s interpretation of 
statutes and court rules pursuant to a Rule 35 motion.38 
The Court rejected Mattatall’s argument that his sentence 
imposed an unauthorized form of punishment.39  The Court 
reasoned that because Mattatall was sentenced to a term in 
prison—”where convicted murderers are sent”—as a result of his 
second-degree murder conviction and not sentenced to death or to a 
public flogging, for example, the form of punishment he received 
was authorized.40 
The Court, however, also rejected the State’s argument.  The 
State argued that “any correction to the judgment would not alter 
Mattatall’s current parole-eligibility date” because 
“notwithstanding the erroneous calculation of the date when 
Mattatall became eligible to apply for parole, he was eventually 
afforded the opportunity to appear”; thus, Mattatall failed to show 
any prejudice from the delay.41  In rejecting both parties’ 
arguments, the Court based its analysis solely on the record and 
held that Mattatall was not entitled to relief under Rule 35.42  The 
Court distinguished illegal sentences under Rule 35 and clerical 
mistakes under Rule 36, but concluded that Mattatall was not 
entitled to relief under either rule.43  The Court concluded that 
Mattatall was not entitled to relief under Rule 35 because “as he 
conceded in Superior Court, the trial justice did not impose an 
illegal sentence.”44  An illegal sentence under Rule 35 would be one 
36. Id. at 1292–93 (quoting State v. Barkmeyer, 32 A.3d 950, 952 (R.I.
2011)). 
37. Id. at 1293 (quoting Barkmeyer, 32 A.3d at 952).




42. Id. at 1293–94.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1294.
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that is not authorized under law, such as a sentence in excess of 
what would be permitted by law, or some kind of unauthorized form 
of punishment for the crime, such as the death penalty—neither of 
which was the case here.45  The Court thus held that the trial 
justice correctly concluded that the law did not permit him to alter 
the sentence without a finding that the sentence was illegal.46 
However, the Court emphasized that Mattatall’s parole 
eligibility was improperly calculated.47  The Court noted that since 
“[n]either the trial justice nor this Court can turn back time . . . 
[t]his unfortunate circumstance cannot be corrected.”48
Accordingly, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and
afforded Mattatall the opportunity to seek relief from the trial
justice.49  The Court recognized that “the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction is an extraordinary measure,” but “[the]
Court under its general supervisory powers can exercise its
inherent power to fashion an appropriate remedy to serve the ends
of justice.”50
COMMENTARY 
In many cases, justice can seem absent from the regular 
courtroom procedure.  It is refreshing, then, when a court looks 
inequity in the face and, even in the most gruesome of cases, 
demonstrates its ability to serve the greater good and hold lower 
courts accountable for their mistakes.  The Mattatall case is a great 
demonstration of such a practice.  
In its analysis, the Court refused to speculate regarding “what 
the parole board would have done had Mattatall timely appeared 
before the board after he had served ten years of the sentence for 
second-degree murder.”51  Still, the Court recognized the inequity 
of the situation. Accordingly, the Court employed some compassion 






50. Id. (quoting State v. Barros, 24 A.3d 1158, 1166 (R.I. 2011) and Bates-
Bridgmon v. Heong’s Market, Inc., 152 A.3d 1137, 1145 (R.I. 2017)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
51. Id.
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occurrence—in order to allow Mattatall to seek relief from the trial 
justice who had presided over his case for almost three decades.52  
Its exercise of supervisory jurisdiction was entirely discretionary, 
so while Mattatall was not successful in his present motion, he was 
at least provided the opportunity to seek recourse via a motion to 
reduce the sentence under Rule 35 or a motion to reduce the parole 
ineligible portion of his sentence.53  The Court recognized that 
Mattatall was entitled to some recourse because his parole 
eligibility had been improperly calculated; the exercise of 
supervisory jurisdiction allowed for a demonstration of sincere 
compassion without simultaneously manipulating the law in 
Mattatall’s favor. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court denied Mattatall’s motion to correct an illegal 
sentence but, “based upon the dilemma wrought by the erroneous 
judgment in this case,” allowed Mattatall to “file a motion to reduce 
the sentence imposed as a habitual criminal in accordance with 
Rule 35 and the general laws, or a motion to reduce the 
nonparolable portion of the sentence.”54 
Alyssa L. Lemire 
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
